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IMAGINARY THREATS TO
GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE
INTERESTS
Helen Norton †
INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the government must speak
in a wide variety of ways if it is to function effectively. 1 Government
expression also serves valuable First Amendment interests in enabling
members of the public to identify and assess their government’s
priorities, thus informing and facilitating the public’s participation in
democratic self-governance. 2 For these reasons, the Court’s
government speech doctrine exempts the government’s own speech
from free speech clause scrutiny. 3

† Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to
participants’ insightful contributions at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Symposium, Government Speech: The Government’s Ability to Compel and Restrict Speech.
Thanks too to Al Canner for very thoughtful comments, and to Jordan Bunch for excellent
research assistance. Special thanks to the Case Western Reserve University Law Review staff
for its exceptional work in organizing an outstanding conference.
1 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in
modern times, at least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to
elect those who run the government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”);
see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1965)
(“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen.”); Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (“[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.”).
2 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970)
(“Participation by the government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature
of any democratic society. It enables the government to inform, explain, and persuade—
measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of
force. Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts, ideas,
and expertise not available from other sources.”).
3 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (characterizing
government’s own speech as “exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”).
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But what does this mean in practice? More specifically, how can
government protect its legitimate—and, indeed, valuable—expressive
interests from encroachment without running afoul of the First
Amendment’s free speech protections for private speakers? As the
Court has held, the First Amendment permits the government to
refuse to allow other parties to join, and thus change or distort, its
own message—i.e., private speakers cannot compel the government
to deliver their own views. 4
Too often, however, governmental bodies are asserting their own
expressive interests to claim—and some courts are permitting them to
exercise—the power to punish private parties’ speech that does not
threaten the government’s ability to express its own views. For
example, some federal courts have relied on government speech
interests to justify the exclusion of peaceful dissenters from
attendance at the government’s public functions, 5 and another has
invoked government’s expressive interests to justify the punishment
of student expression in public schools. 6 By identifying such
troubling examples, this essay urges attention to, and concern for, this
trend’s potential spread.
This is only the most recent disquieting development to emerge
from the Supreme Court’s “recently minted government speech
doctrine.” 7 As I have written elsewhere, the Court “has been too
quick to defer to public entities’ assertions that contested speech is
their own; indeed, it has yet to deny the government’s claim to speech
in the face of a competing private claim.” 8 As just one example, the
4 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (characterizing a town’s decision about which
monuments to display in its park as the government’s own expressive choice, such that it was
free to decline displays that it considered inconsistent with its own message); see also Page v.
Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the government
speech doctrine permits a school board to announce its opposition to pending voucher
legislation on its website without requiring it to post the plaintiff’s pro-voucher materials as
well); Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
government speech doctrine permits the government to present a holiday message to citizens
without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate the message of dissenting private
parties); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the government speech doctrine permits a school district to post materials celebrating Gay
and Lesbian Awareness Month on its bulletin boards without requiring it to post a teacher’s antigay materials as well).
5 See, e.g., Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7
(2010); Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4838682, at *7–8 (D. Colo.
Nov. 6, 2008).
6 See, e.g., Doe v. Silsbee Ind. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
79 U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011).
7 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8 Helen Norton, Shining a Light on Democracy’s Dark Lagoon, 61 S.C. L. REV. 535, 536
(2010); see also Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U.
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Court has been far too willing to permit the government to control the
speech of its workers to protect its own asserted expressive interests. 9
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 10 the Court held that public employees’
speech made “pursuant to their official duties” receives no First
Amendment protection because the government should be permitted
to “exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.” 11 It thus rejected the First Amendment
claim of a prosecutor disciplined after writing an internal
memorandum critical of the police. 12
The Court’s willingness to permit government control over public
employees’ expression by characterizing such speech as the
government’s own for which it has paid a salary—regardless of that
expression’s value to the public—has deeply disturbing implications
not only for government workers’ free speech rights, but also for the
public’s access to information about its government’s effectiveness.13
Indeed, lower courts now routinely apply Garcetti to reject First
Amendment claims by police officers terminated for challenging
public officials’ illegal behavior, financial managers discharged for
reporting fiscal improprieties, police officers fired for reporting health
and safety violations, and health care workers punished for expressing
concerns about patient care. 14
L. REV. 899, 902 (2010) (“Deference to government, more than any other principle, seems to
explain” the Court’s government speech determinations.).
9 As another example of the Court’s willingness to defer to government’s
characterization of contested speech as its own, it has also failed to require government to
identify itself publicly as the source of a message as a condition of claiming the government
speech defense to a First Amendment claim. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578 n.8 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the benefits of
allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing its sponsorship of expression outweigh
the additional imposition on First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court
describes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to think First Amendment doctrine
should accommodate the Government’s subterfuge.”).
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
11 Id. at 421–22.
12 Id. at 424.
13 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing the
current judicial environment and its implications for public employee’s First Amendment
claims).
14 See id. at 4–5 and 14–15 (detailing examples); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 8,
at 912 (offering additional examples of lower courts’ application of Garcetti to dispose of public
employees’ First Amendment claims). A few judges, however, have resisted this trend by
seeking to limit Garcetti’s reach—and its often disturbing consequences—by taking a hard look
at whether a public employee’s contested speech actually occurred pursuant to her official job
duties. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) (urging “a less expansive definition of speech” pursuant to public employees’
official duties when deciding whether Garcetti applies); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d at 272
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As just one illustration of the post-Garcetti landscape, consider the
Eighth Circuit’s recent rejection of a First Amendment claim by
Omaha’s Public Safety Auditor, who was fired after she published a
report that urged improvement in the police department’s
performance in certain areas. 15 The report “describe[d], by analyzing
traffic stop complaints, how the [Omaha Police Department] finds
itself currently estranged from many of the communities it serves and
offers suggestions about how it can repair those relations.” 16 The
Eighth Circuit found the report to be unprotected speech under
Garcetti because such expression was part of the auditor’s official
duties to review citizen complaints against the city’s public safety
agencies. 17 In other words, Garcetti means that even truthful
expression by a government worker on a matter of great public
importance is entirely unprotected when—and, indeed, because—the
worker is simply doing her job. 18
Garcetti and its progeny thus exemplify a government speech
doctrine increasingly unmoored from its theoretical underpinnings—
one that fails to recognize that the constitutional value of government
speech is rooted entirely in its ability to further, rather than frustrate,
the government’s accountability to its electorate. The remainder of
this essay identifies and explores new and related developments, as
some lower courts now rely on government speech rationales to limit
free speech rights far outside of the public employment context. These
cases feature courts that are disturbingly quick to define the
government’s expressive interests extremely broadly, and quicker still
to perceive private individuals’ speech as threatening those interests.
In short, although government has a substantial interest in protecting
its ability to communicate its own views, these courts have been all
too willing to imagine threats to that interest where none exist.
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (observing that courts’ failure carefully to scrutinize whether
contested speech was actually delivered pursuant to a public employee’s official duties and thus
unprotected by Garcetti “would have profound adverse effects on accountability in
government”).
15 Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010).
16 Id. at 589.
17 Id. at 592–93.
18 Judge Rovner powerfully described this dynamic when reluctantly concurring in the
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s
reports that his supervisor was engaged in unlawful activity because the officer’s statement was
made pursuant to his official duties: “Detective Kolatski was performing his job admirably at
the time of these events, and although his demotion for truthfully reporting allegations of
misconduct may be morally repugnant, after Garcetti it does not offend the First Amendment.”
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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I: GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE
DISSENTING ATTENDEES FROM PUBLIC FUNCTIONS TO
PROTECT ITS ASSERTED EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS
Some public entities have aggressively asserted—and some courts
have accepted—government speech interests to justify the exclusion
of non-disruptive dissenters from attendance at the government’s
expressive public functions. 19 These developments reveal a troubling
misunderstanding of what the government speech doctrine does, and
does not, empower government to do to protect its expressive
interests, and a distressing failure to recall that the First Amendment
requires the government’s toleration of peaceful dissent. 20
That government acts as both regulator and speaker (along with its
many other roles, such as employer, educator, property owner, etc.)
does not mean that we cannot parse those roles when assessing the
constitutionality of its action. 21 Although we should be slow to
19 First Circuit Judge Torruella presciently anticipated this development in an earlier
government speech case. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009)
(Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority's position has the potential of permitting a
governmental entity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-owned
channels so long as the governmental entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact.
What is to stop a governmental entity from applying the doctrine to a parade? Or official
events? It is nearly impossible to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination on government
channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as ‘government speech.’” (citations
omitted)).
20 The protection of peaceful dissent furthers the values most often identified at the heart
of the First Amendment, which include protecting individual interests in autonomy and selfexpression, facilitating citizen participation in democratic self-government, and contributing to
the discovery of truth and the development of knowledge. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1987) (“Most theoretical writings have suggested variants of four
different values as critical to speech protection: individual development, democratic
government, social stability, and truth.” (footnotes omitted)).
Indeed, the developments described in this essay illustrate Mark Yudof’s great fear—
expressed in his groundbreaking work on government speech—that government would use its
own speech to falsify consent by excluding dissent. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 15 (1983). For more
contemporary concerns that the Court’s government speech doctrine may facilitate the
suppression of dissent, see Joseph Blocher, Government Viewpoint and Government Speech, 52
B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011) (arguing that the government speech doctrine rewards viewpoint
discrimination); Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum,
2010 BYU L. REV. 2203 (encouraging courts and officials to avoid many of the potentially
troubling implications of Summum).
21 The government is unique among all speakers—indeed, among all actors—because of
its coercive power as sovereign. To be sure, however, there remains a meaningful distinction
between government expression and government coercion. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Right
Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith’s, Why is Government Speech
Problematic?, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2010, 9:14AM), http://www.denver
lawreview.org/government-speech/ (“First Amendment doctrine appropriately distinguishes
between these two scenarios because the government’s own speech can rarely influence the
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assume that government expression is inevitably coercive given the
considerable instrumental value of transparently governmental
speech, 22 we should be slower still to excuse government’s
punishment of private expression as an acceptable means of
protecting its expressive interests. Yet some courts have displayed a
disconcerting willingness to defer to government’s claim that it may
engage in coercion to protect its expression.
For example, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in
Weise v. Casper, 23 a case in which the lower courts expressly invoked
government speech concerns to justify the exclusion of nondisruptive
private citizens from an official governmental function based simply
on their dissenting views. 24 Weise involved a First Amendment
challenge by two individuals who were forcibly ejected from
President Bush’s speech on Social Security that was otherwise open
to the public simply because they arrived at the event’s parking lot in
a car with a “No More Blood for Oil” bumper sticker. 25 As described
by the Tenth Circuit on appeal, “Sometime before the President’s
speech, the White House Advance Office established a policy of
excluding those who disagree with the President from the President’s
official public appearances.” 26
The federal district court found no constitutional violation, using
language that suggests a vivid imagination with respect to threats to
government’s expressive interests: “Plaintiffs [sic] complaint is
essentially that they were not permitted to participate in the
President’s speech. President Bush had the right, at his own speech, to
ensure that only his message was conveyed. When the President
speaks, he may choose his own words.” 27

public debate in the same qualitative or quantitative way as when it excludes private speakers’
ideas from the marketplace.”).
22 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2000)
(explaining that government persuasion is distinguishable from government coercion).
23 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010).
24 Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4838682, at *7–8 (D. Colo.
Nov. 6, 2008).
25 Id. at *1-2.
26 Weise, 593 F.3d at 1165.
27 Weise, 2008 WL 4838682, at *8 (emphasis omitted). The district court then cited a
Tenth Circuit government speech case, Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 1143
(10th Cir. 2001), which held that the government speech doctrine permits the government to
present a holiday message to citizens without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate
the message of dissenting private parties. Id. at *8. But unlike the plaintiff in Wells (who sought
to require the city to include her message objecting to government endorsement of the holidays
in its public holiday display), the Weise plaintiffs did not seek to have the President or any other
government speaker incorporate a dissenting message of their own.
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True enough. But the plaintiffs in no way threatened that choice.
They did not seek to participate in the President’s speech or to
interfere with his chosen message. They sought only to listen to it—
and to ask a question if questions were permitted28 Indeed, although
the government speech doctrine certainly permits President Bush to
control the content of his own speech and to refuse to share the
event’s podium and microphone with dissenters (or any other
speakers), his expressive interests are in no way threatened by the
mere presence of those who may disagree with his views.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on qualified immunity grounds,
citing—inter alia—the Supreme Court’s most recent government
speech decision, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, before concluding
that the law is not clearly established as to “how to treat the ejection
of a silent attendee from an official speech based on the attendee’s
protected expression outside the speech area.” 29 In other words, the
appellate court suggested that the emergence of the government
speech doctrine sufficiently muddied the legal waters to uphold the
defendants’ qualified immunity claim:
At the most general level, Plaintiffs are correct that the
government usually cannot discriminate against a speaker
based on that speaker’s viewpoint. But in qualified immunity
cases, except in the most obvious cases, broad, general
propositions of law are insufficient to suggest clearly
established law. That is because the clearly established law
must be such that it would put a reasonable official on notice
that his conduct was unlawful. That is particularly true here.
Beyond the abstract principle that the government ordinarily
cannot discriminate based upon viewpoint, however, a First
Amendment claim must be situated somewhere within the
free speech jurisprudence because we accord speech various
levels of protection depending upon the nature of the speech,
the speaker, and the setting. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum . . . (because government speech ‘is not subject to

28 Weise, 593 F.3d at 1165–66 (“Plaintiffs claim that they never disrupted the event,
intended to disrupt the event, or indicated that they would disrupt the event. [One of the
plaintiffs] would have asked the President a question, if given the opportunity.” (citation
omitted)).
29 Id. at 1170.
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the Free Speech Clause,’ the government as speaker can
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint). 30
....
. . . To be sure, in some obvious situations, general
authority may put a reasonable public official on notice that
his or her conduct is violative of constitutional rights. This is
not one of them. 31
But as Judge Holloway made clear in a vigorous and wellreasoned dissent, this should have been an easy win for the plaintiffs:
On what basis could a representative of the executive branch
have thought, on seeing Plaintiffs alight from Ms. Weise’s car
with its bumper sticker, that they could be excluded from a
public event solely because Ms. Weise had chosen to exercise
her most fundamental First Amendment right outside of the
event and in the complete absence of any indication that
Plaintiffs intended to even speak at the event, much less any
indication of any intent to disrupt the event? 32
Justice Ginsburg echoed this bewilderment in her dissent from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari (joined by Justice Sotomayor): “I
cannot see how reasonable public officials, or any staff or volunteers
under their direction, could have viewed the bumper sticker as a
permissible reason for depriving [the plaintiffs] of access to the
event.” 33
Other public officials have offered similarly expansive arguments
in defense of their efforts to exclude potential dissenters from public
functions. For example, in Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v.
Corzine, 34 the governor of New Jersey asserted a government speech
defense to excuse the exclusion and arrest of dissenters from a town
hall meeting at a high school auditorium where he proposed to present
a financial restructuring and debt reduction plan to town citizens for
Id. at 1167–68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1170.
32 Id. at 1175 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
33 Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also
noted, however, that this particular suit (in which the defendants were volunteers rather than
government employees) could be distinguished from still-pending suits against the White House
officials alleged to have ordered the ejection—suits that “may offer this Court an opportunity to
take up the issue avoided today.” Id. at 8.
34 720 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. N.J. 2010).
30
31
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their feedback. 35 The governor had permitted a nonprofit organization
supportive of his plan (Save Our State) to set up registration tables,
display literature and signs, and place a banner over the auditorium’s
stage. 36 The city police advised the plaintiffs (who opposed the
governor’s plan), however, that they could not peacefully display
signs or distribute literature in the auditorium or on the facility’s
grounds, and arrested the plaintiffs when they did so. 37 In his motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the governor
asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he
adopted the speech of Save Our State, transforming it into
government speech. . . . The premise of the argument is that
by adopting Save Our State’s speech, it not only transformed
Save Our State’s speech into government speech, it also
eliminated any security or disruption risks posed by Save Our
State’s displaying of signs and distributing of literature, such
that the Court could find that those content-neutral rationales
and not viewpoint-discrimination explained the restriction on
Plaintiffs’ identical behavior. 38
The federal district court appropriately rejected the governor’s
argument and denied his motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claim. 39 In so holding, it recognized that the government
speech doctrine empowers the governor to control the podium or the
microphone at his official events, 40 but not to exclude non-disruptive
private parties with different views who posed no threat to his ability
to deliver his governmental message:
The Governor could, for example, invite the President of
Save Our State to introduce him at the meeting without also
permitting [the plaintiff] to give some opening remarks. As in
this case, the Governor could also hang the Save Our State
banner above the stage, and perhaps permit only Save Our
State to set up registration tables.

Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 625.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 630-31.
39 Id. at 633.
40 Id. (“The discriminatory treatment of who may hang a banner on the stage is
permissible because the existence of a limited public forum does not itself give any speaker the
right to get up on stage during another speaker’s time, or to otherwise become a part of the
organizing speaker’s message.”).
35
36
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However, in this case, the State is actually asking for
something more than what a private speaker would be entitled
to: the ability not just to control its own speech and prevent
disruption, but the ability to exclude even peaceful, nondisruptive dissent that does not confuse or impair the
government’s message.
....
Holding signs and distributing leaflets at a state-sponsored
rally is not the same as directly participating in the message
being expressed in the rally. And therefore the right of the
government to control its message does not extend to control
over that dissenting speech. 41
The government speech doctrine empowers the government to
choose certain messages as its own, but not to ensure the absence of
those with dissenting views from its expressive functions (especially
through their forcible ejection or arrest, as occurred in these cases). In
both Weise and Corzine, the government’s message was transparently
governmental: President Bush could make clear his views on Social
Security, and Governor Corzine his views on financial restructuring.
In neither case did the presence of peaceful dissenters threaten the
delivery of those views. Yet, in both cases, the government claimed
more power than the government speech doctrine provides it.
The government speech doctrine provides public entities with a
defense to free speech claims by private speakers who seek to join,
alter, or otherwise interfere with the government’s delivery of its own
views. But in neither case did the plaintiffs seek any such thing. In
Weise, the plaintiffs did not seek to share the microphone nor the
podium with the President, but instead sought merely to listen. In
Corzine, the plaintiffs did not seek to require the government to print
out literature expressing their dissenting views, nor to reserve them an
auditorium for their own press conference; instead, they sought
merely to attend the event and peacefully distribute their own
literature. Only in Corzine, however, did the court take appropriate
care to determine whether, if at all, a private speaker would
undermine the government’s ability to deliver its own views,
carefully attending to whether the dissenting speech would in fact
“interfere or be confused with” that of the government. 42
41
42

Id. at 633–34 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 634 (“It does not follow from Hurley or its logic that the rightful temporary
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II: GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF STUDENT SPEECH TO
PROTECT ITS ASSERTED EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS
Next consider the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision upholding a
public school’s punishment of student speech, which illustrates yet
another context in which lower courts have invoked government’s
expressive interests to scuttle private speakers’ First Amendment
claims. In Doe v. Silsbee Independent School District, 43 the court
considered a public high school student’s First Amendment challenge
to her dismissal from the cheerleading squad when she failed to cheer
for a basketball player who she alleged had sexually assaulted her.44
(Rather than cheering, she folded her arms and remained silent when
the player in question was at the free throw line.) 45
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that public school
students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse
gates, 46 even while making clear that those rights are not coextensive
with those of adults in other settings in light of the practical realities
of the school environment. 47 Indeed, the Court has recognized
students’ (and other individuals’) strong expressive interest in not
being compelled by the government to speak in a way contrary to
their values. 48 Along these lines, requiring an individual to cheer for

occupier of the limited public forum may exclude from the forum all competing messages of
any kind, regardless of whether they would interfere or be confused with the speech of the
organizer. . . . The Court has no reason to believe that government’s power should be greater
than that of a private speaker in these circumstances.”).
43 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011).
44 According to news reports, the athlete later “pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of
misdemeanor assault. He was fined $2,500 and ordered to perform 150 hours of community
service and take an anger-management course.” Bob Egelko, Cheerleader Suit Tackles Students’
Rights Issue, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2010, at A1.
45 Id.
46 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
47 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (explaining that First
Amendment rights must be applied in light of the special circumstances found in schools);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (explaining that the same latitude
given to an adult using an offensive form of expression to make a political point is not
necessarily extended to children in public schools).
48 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that the First
Amendment does not permit a state to compel an objecting private speaker to display the state’s
motto on his car’s license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit public schools to compel objecting
students to salute the flag). Recall that one of the First Amendment’s primary purposes in
protecting speech from government constraint is to preserve individuals’ interest in autonomy
and self-expression. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (“Over the years, we have come to view freedom of
expression as essential to: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the
discovery of truth; (3) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and
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her alleged attacker offers an unusually powerful example of an
action repugnant to individual autonomy. But in a per curiam opinion
by Judges Clement, Garza, and Owen, the Fifth Circuit panel made no
mention of that interest, emphasizing instead the school’s expressive
interests and characterizing the plaintiff as “contractually required to
cheer for the basketball team.” 49 It then rejected her First Amendment
claim in a single paragraph:
In her capacity as cheerleader, H.S. served as a mouthpiece
through which [the school] could disseminate speech-namely,
support for its athletic teams. Insofar as the First Amendment
does not require schools to promote particular student speech,
[the school] had no duty to promote H.S.’s message by
allowing her to cheer or not cheer, as she saw fit. Moreover,
this act constituted substantial interference with the work of
the school because, as a cheerleader, H.S. was at the
basketball game for the purpose of cheering, a position she
undertook voluntarily. 50
The Fifth Circuit’s cursory discussion variously alluded to Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 51 Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 52 and the government speech doctrine to
support its ruling. But none of these doctrines provides sufficient
justification to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim,
especially when we remain attentive to the constitutional purposes
underlying each. The remainder of this Part considers each in turn.
A. Government Speech
Although the Silsbee opinion never directly mentioned the term
“government speech,” nor did it cite to any government speech
decision, the Fifth Circuit’s reference to the school’s interest in
disseminating speech through the cheerleader-as-mouthpiece 53
indicates a focus on the school’s power to protect its own expression.
To be sure, public schools—like other government entities—have a

(4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability and change.”).
49 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 853 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011).
50 Id. at 855.
51 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
53 Silsbee, 402 F. App’x at 855.
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wide variety of views to communicate, and the government speech
doctrine appropriately permits them to protect that expression from
distortion by private speakers. Examples include a school district’s
decision to express its opposition to pending school voucher
legislation on its website and in e-mails and letters to parents and
school employees, 54 as well as a school district’s expression of
support for Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month celebrations through
postings on its bulletin boards. 55 In both cases, federal appellate
courts applied the government speech doctrine to reject First
Amendment claims by private speakers who sought to require the
schools to alter their own message by delivering or posting the
plaintiffs’ contrary views on the school’s website, bulletin boards, and
letters to parents and employees. 56 As the Ninth Circuit explained,
The narrow question we must answer is whether the First
Amendment compels a public high school to share the
podium with a teacher with antagonistic and contrary views
when the school speaks to its own constituents on the subject
of how students should behave towards each other while in
school. The answer to this question clearly is no. 57
But even if the Fifth Circuit meant to apply the government speech
doctrine to the facts in Silsbee, whether the plaintiff’s silence
undermined the school’s expressive interest in supporting its athletic
teams is not at all clear, and deserves careful examination. Here, the
plaintiff did not seek to have the school express support for, or help
her deliver, her own opinions. She did not demand that the school
post her views on its website or bulletin boards nor include her
message in its letters to students and employees. She simply declined
to cheer.
Yet the Fifth Circuit engaged in no such analysis; instead it
permitted the school to protect its own expressive interests by
controlling—even compelling—her speech. In so doing, perhaps the
panel sought to treat students who engage in certain roles as akin to
Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2008).
Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
56 Page, 531 F.3d at 281–85 (holding that the First Amendment did not require the school
district to post the plaintiff’s pro-voucher materials on its website, which announced the
school’s opposition to pending voucher legislation, while emphasizing that the First
Amendment would not permit the government to punish dissenters for expressing their views on
their own websites); Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013-14 (holding that the First Amendment did not
require the school district to permit the plaintiff to post materials questioning homosexuality’s
morality on school bulletin boards celebrating Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month).
57 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1005.
54
55
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public employees under Garcetti—i.e., as speakers whose expression
pursuant to their “official” (here, cheerleading) duties is unprotected
by the First Amendment and thus entirely within the school’s
control. 58 More specifically, the panel’s reference to the plaintiff as
“contractually required to cheer” 59 and “as a mouthpiece through
which [the school] could disseminate speech” 60 is reminiscent of the
Garcetti Court’s characterization of public employees’ speech
“pursuant to [their] official duties” as speech that “the employer itself
has commissioned or created” and is thus permitted to control without
running afoul of the First Amendment. 61 Just as we saw in Garcetti, 62
the Silsbee court appears to impose a formalistic bright-line rule to
dispose of a plaintiff’s First Amendment claims rather than engage in
the “often-challenging but entirely commonplace task of balancing
constitutional interests.” 63 In both cases, the courts were entirely too
quick to defer to government’s purported expressive interests without
any discussion of whether the plaintiff’s speech actually threatened
those interests, much less any consideration of the plaintiff’s
considerable countervailing free speech interests.

58 See Silsbee, 402 F. App’x at 855 (“[A]s a cheerleader, H.S. was at the basketball game
for the purpose of cheering, a position she undertook voluntarily.”).
59 Id. at 853.
60 Id. at 855.
61 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 401, 421–22 (2006). That Garcetti’s effects have the
potential to spread in this way is further supported by various courts’ past willingness to extend
First Amendment doctrine governing public employees’ speech to the expression of students
and private speakers who engage in contractual and other relationships with public entities. See,
e.g., Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007)
(relying on public employee precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of a
private school that had voluntarily joined a governmental athletic association); Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674–76 (1996) (relying on public-employee speech
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of an independent contractor);
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596–98 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on public-employee speech
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of student-athletes); Decotiis v.
Whittemore, 680 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 n.2 (D. Me. 2010) (relying on public-employee speech
precedents for guidance in assessing the First Amendment claims of a government contractor);
see also Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and Expanding Notions of
Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7 (2008) (noting parallel developments in the Court’s
First Amendment doctrines governing public employee and student speech).
62 See 547 U.S. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”).
63 Norton, supra note 13, at 33.
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B. Analysis under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District
In Tinker, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to
permit public schools to regulate student speech at school that
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” or
“would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school.” 64
Of the Court’s various rules governing public schools’ ability to
regulate student speech, Tinker is by far the least deferential to the
government. 65 In Tinker, the Court made clear that the school’s
interest must be “more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” 66
Instead, the school must show that the regulated speech is reasonably
likely to “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” 67 Applying
this rule, the Court found that a school could not make such a
showing with respect to students wearing black armbands at school in
protest of the Vietnam War, and held their discipline to be a First
Amendment violation. 68
Although the Fifth Circuit does not say so explicitly, its conclusion
in Silsbee that the plaintiff’s act “constituted substantial interference
with the work of the school” 69 suggests that it intended to apply
Tinker’s substantial interference test to the cheerleader’s expression.
If so, however, its Tinker analysis is enormously, and inappropriately,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007) (interpreting the First
Amendment to permit schools to “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (interpreting the First Amendment to permit schools to regulate
students’ lewd and vulgar speech at an official assembly). Neither Fraser nor Morse require
schools to justify their actions by showing that student speech on those topics was or would be
disruptive.
66 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also id. at 508–09 (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the
majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this
sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national
strength . . . .” (citation omitted)).
67 Id. at 513 (alteration omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
68 Id. at 513–14.
69 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011). The panel opinion had cited to Tinker itself in the preceding paragraph.
Id.
64
65
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deferential to the school’s expressive interests. Note, for example,
that the panel asserted only that the plaintiff’s speech interfered with
the school’s expressive interest in cheering on its athletic teams 70
rather than identifying any threatened disorder or disruption to
“schoolwork or discipline” of the sort identified in Tinker as an
interest sufficient to justify regulation of student speech on school
premises. 71 Whether a school’s interest in protecting its own
expression—here, an interest in cheering for its sports teams—is ever
sufficient to justify the punishment of student speech under Tinker
remains a substantial question that the Fifth Circuit did not address.
Even if a school’s interest in cheering for its athletic teams could
be considered sufficiently weighty to satisfy Tinker, the Fifth Circuit
offered no discussion—much less required any showing—that she
“material[ly] and substantial[ly] interfere[d]” 72 with that interest: she
did not curse, yell at, or cheer against the athlete nor did she cheer for
the other team. She simply remained silent. A thoughtful analysis in
this case—and a fair application of Tinker’s rigorous scrutiny—would
have considered whether her silence, without more, materially and
substantially interfered with the school’s interests.
C. Analysis under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court crafted a more deferential rule
that applies to “expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.” 73 There it distinguished schools’
regulation of student speech on school premises generally (e.g., the
type of regulation rigorously scrutinized in Tinker) from schools’
efforts to avoid being inaccurately perceived as promoting or
sponsoring student speech:
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the
school premises. The latter question concerns educators’
Id.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
72 Id. Tinker requires that schools prove that the student speech to be regulated actually
cause, or reasonably be forecast to cause, material and substantial disorder or disruption. Id. at
514.
73 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); see also Morse, 127 S.
Ct. at 2627 (“[Hazelwood] does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe
that Frederick’s banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”); id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring)
(characterizing Hazelwood as “allow[ing] a school to regulate what is in essence the school’s
own speech, that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official school organ”).
70
71
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authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. 74
The Court then interpreted the First Amendment to permit schools to
“exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 75
In developing such a rule, the Hazelwood Court sought to protect
schools’ power to “assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed
to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed
to the school.” 76 It then applied its new rule to uphold as
constitutional a school’s refusal to publish articles in its newspaper
discussing student experiences with birth control, pregnancy, and
divorce. 77
Although its extremely cursory discussion does not makes its
mode(s) of analysis clear, the Silsbee court’s statement that the school
had no duty to “promote” the plaintiff’s speech 78 appears to invoke
the deferential Hazelwood test. 79 But none of the Hazelwood Court’s
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 273. The Hazelwood Court identified the school’s pedagogical concerns over
newspaper articles on students’ experience with birth control, pregnancy, and divorce to include
student and family privacy, journalistic fairness, and readers’ maturity. Id. at 274–75.
76 Id. at 271 (“A school may “disassociate itself . . . from speech that is, for example,
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane,
or unsuitable for immature audiences.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Some
of the Supreme Court’s other student speech cases also signal its concern that schools not be
misunderstood as endorsing views that may be antithetical to their chosen educational mission.
See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2007) (crediting concern that a principal’s
failure to discipline the plaintiff’s speech “would send a powerful message to the students in her
charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug
use”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (“[I]t was perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.”).
77 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73.
78 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011). The panel cited Hazelwood as support. Id.
79 To be sure, government has a significant interest in protecting the integrity of its own
expression—i.e., in ensuring that it is held politically responsible only for its own views, and not
those of others mistakenly attributed to it. See Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s
Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1347
(2004) (“First Amendment values are not frustrated by government efforts to protect its
expression that deprive a private speaker of only the opportunity to speak in a setting that
mistakenly conveys the government’s endorsement of his or her speech, while leaving the
74
75
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concerns appears to be implicated in Silsbee: neither the school nor
the Fifth Circuit identified any way in which the plaintiff’s speech
interfered with learning or any other pedagogical goal, exposed any
observer to inappropriate speech, or misled reasonable onlookers to
interpret her silence as reflecting the school’s views.
More specifically, the deferential Hazelwood rule first requires a
determination that reasonable onlookers will likely misattribute the
student’s speech to the school, as the Hazelwood Court appropriately
recognized schools’ interest in ensuring that “the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” 80 To
be sure, a school’s efforts to educate are too easily undermined if it
cannot ensure that contrary private opinions are not mistakenly
assigned to it. But this interest is only threatened when the school can
demonstrate its reasonable concern that others’ speech will be
mistakenly understood as its own. Consider, for example, a student’s
non-disruptive replies to a teacher’s in-class questions in which the
student expresses opinions inconsistent with the school’s views on
certain matters. No one would interpret the student’s speech as
bearing the school’s imprimatur simply because it occurred in the
context of the classroom—i.e., school-sponsored curricular speech.
For this reason, a thoughtful application of Hazelwood would
certainly permit the teacher or any school official to disagree with or
otherwise rebut the student’s speech through counter-speech—but not
to punish the student for her dissenting views when they posed no
danger of being mistakenly attributed to the school. 81

speaker free to deliver the same message elsewhere.”). The Supreme Court has yet to consider,
and thus the lower courts have yet to work out, the relationship between its Hazelwood rule and
the more recent emergence of its government speech doctrine—even though both involve
attention to government’s expressive interests. For scholarly treatment of the issue, see Alan
Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos
of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722
(2009) (arguing that school-sponsored activities should be characterized as a “nonforum”—a
new category “located on the free speech doctrinal continuum between the nonpublic forum and
government speech”—and not subject to free speech clause scrutiny); Casarez, supra note 61, at
1 (proposing a “hybrid speech analysis” to balance the interests of individual and government
speakers in school-sponsored activities, as well as in public employment).
80 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
81 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The opinion of the Court does
not endorse the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First
Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a
school’s ‘educational mission.’ . . . [S]ome public schools have defined their educational
missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by [school
officials and faculty].”).
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What are the dangers that the Silsbee plaintiff’s opinions would be
mistakenly attributed to the school? On one hand, the plaintiff was
“on duty” as a cheerleader in a school uniform at a school-sponsored
athletic event. 82 On the other hand, she simply remained silent; she
did not cheer against the athlete nor for the other team. Under the
circumstances, the likelihood that reasonable onlookers would
interpret her silence as reflecting the school’s views remains
unexamined and unproven. 83
A thoughtful analysis under Hazelwood would have considered
whether the plaintiff’s silence in this context would mislead
reasonable observers into assigning certain views to the school. But
rather than carefully considering whether her speech posed any threat
to the school’s expressive interests by leading viewers inaccurately to
attribute her views to the school, the Fifth Circuit instead simply
assumed threats to those interests. 84
CONCLUSION
The government’s expressive claims in these cases are potentially
breathtaking in scope, as they assert the power to punish private
parties’ speech that does not threaten the government’s ability to
express its own views. Even more troubling, some lower courts
permit government entities to exercise this power, deferring to the
government’s assertions that the plaintiffs’ speech endangers its own
expressive interests.
But other lower courts resist these arguments, recognizing that a
meaningful commitment to free speech instead requires skepticism of
the government’s expressive claims unless and until the government
can persuade us that its efforts are not a pretext for squelching private
82 For a discussion of the circumstances under which a public employee’s speech might
reasonably be understood as bearing the imprimatur of his or her governmental employer, see
Norton, supra note 13, at 47–67.
83 For a discussion of how onlookers use a variety of “source cues” to determine the
source of a message, see Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 607–09 (2008).
84 Finally, even if the school could show the danger of such misattribution, Hazelwood
still requires that the school show that its action in dismissing the student was “reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. The school made no
such argument, see Brief of Appellee, Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist. 402 F. App’x 852 (5th
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-41075), and the Fifth Circuit discussed none. Id.
Another unresolved issue—although not one in play in Silsbee—is whether Hazelwood
permits schools to engage in viewpoint-based distinctions in addressing their pedagogical
concerns. See, e.g., Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored
Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (explaining
the circuit split on whether Hazelwood creates a constitutional exception allowing viewpoint
restrictions on student expression for pedagogical purposes).
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dissent. 85 Which trend will prevail depends on how carefully we think
about the circumstances under which private speech actually threatens
the government’s expressive interests. Respect for First Amendment
values should caution us to be slow to imagine such threats.

85 For additional examples of lower courts skeptical of government’s asserted expressive
interests, see Norton & Citron, supra note 8, at 917, 929–30; Norton, supra note 8, at 537–42,
546–47.

